To say that the Chinese Communist revolution is a non-Western
revolution is more than a clich‚. That revolution has been primarily
directed, not like the French Revolution but against alien Western
influences that approached the level of domination and drastically
altered China's traditional relationship with the world. Hence the

Chinese Communist attitude toward China's traditional past is
selectively critical, but by no means totally hostile. The Chinese

Communist revolution, and the foreign policy of the regime to which it
has given rise, have several roots, each of which is embedded in the
past more deeply than one would tend to expect of a movement seemingly
so convulsive.

The Chinese superiority complex institutionalized in their
tributary system was justified by any standards less advanced or
efficient than those of the modern West. China developed an elaborate
and effective political system resting on a remarkable cultural
unity, the latter in turn being due mainly to the general acceptance
of a common, although difficult, written language and a common set of
ethical and social values, known as Confucianism. Traditional china
had neither the knowledge nor the power that would have been necessary
to cope with the superior science, technology, economic organization,
and military force that expanding West brought to bear on it. The
general sense of national weakness and humiliation was rendered still
keener by a unique phenomenon, the modernization of Japan and its rise
to great power status. Japan's success threw China's failure into
sharp remission.

The Japanese performance contributed to the discrediting and
collapse of China's imperial system, but it did little to make things
easier for the subsequent successor. The Republic was never able to
achieve territorial and national unity in the face of bad
communications and the widespread diffusion of modern arms throughout
the country. Lacking internal authority, it did not carry much weight
in its foreign relations. As it struggled awkwardly, there arose two
more radical political forces, the relatively powerful Kuomintang of

Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and the younger and weaker

Communist Party of China (CPC ). With indispensable support from the

CPC and the Third International, the Kuomintang achieved sufficient
success so it felt justified in proclaiming a new government,
controlled by itself, for the whole of China. For a time the

Kuomintang made a valiant effort to tackle China's numerous and
colossal problems, including those that had ruined its predecessor :
poor communications and the wide distribution of arms. It also took a
strongly anti-Western course in its foreign relations, with some
success. It is impossible to say whether the Kuomintang's regime would
ultimately have proven viable and successful if it had not been ruined
by an external enemy, as the Republic had been by its internal
opponents. The more the Japanese exerted preemptive pressures on

China, the more the people tended to look on the Kuomintang as
the only force that prevent china from being dominated by Japan.

During the Sino-Japanese war of 1937, the Kuomintang immediately
suffered major military defeats and lost control of eastern China. It
was only saved from total hopelessness or defeat by Japan's suicidal
decision to attack the United States and invasion of Southeastern

Asia. But military rescue from Japan brought no significant
improvement in the Kuomintang's domestic performance in the political
and economic fields, which if anything to get worse. Clearly the
pre-Communist history of Modern China has been essentially one of
weakness, humiliation, and failure. This is the atmosphere in which
the CPC developed its leadership and growth in. The result has been a
strong determination on the part of that leadership to eliminate
foreign influence within China, to modernize their country, and to
eliminate Western influence from eastern Asia, which included the

Soviet Union. China was changing and even developing, but its
overwhelming marks were still poverty and weakness. During their rise
to power the Chinese Communists, like most politically conscious

Chinese, were aware of these conditions and anxious to eliminate them.

Mao Tse-tung envisioned a mixed economy under Communist control, such
as had existed in the Soviet Union during the period of the New

Economic Policy. The stress was more upon social justice, and public
ownership of the "commanding heights" of the economy than upon
development. In 1945, Mao was talking more candidly about development,
still within the framework of a mixed economy under Communist control,
and stressing the need for more heavy industry; I believe because he
had been impressed by the role of heavy industry in determine the
outcome of World War II. In his selected works he said "that the
necessary capital would come mainly from the accumulated wealth of the

Chinese people" but latter added "that China would appreciate foreign
aid and even private foreign investment, under non